philosophy, this common conception of their enterprise still gave rise to deep philosophical differences. Indeed, in the case of moral philosophy, it led to positions diametrically opposed. For while it is accurate to say that Hume believed morality more properly felt than judged of, Reid expressly held morality to be more properly judged of than felt. 'In the approbation of a good action ... there is feeling indeed, but there is also esteem of the agent; and both the feeling and the esteem depend upon the judgment we form of his conduct'3 My aim in this paper is to explain how these contradictory accounts of the place of feeling in morality can arise from what appears to be the same method, the same 'science of mind'.
I
Hume's largest and most important work is not entitled A Treatise of Human Nature by accident. The use of the term 'nature' here is significant, because the model of inquiry he has in mind is that of Bacon and Newton. In a sense the Treatise is not really a work of philosophy as traditionally conceived at all. It is rather, an exploration in what Hume (along with many others of his time) calls 'the science of man'. The distinction between natural science and philosophy is more marked now than in Hume's day, and his using the terms almost interchangeably may disguise what is in reality a important shift. In the modern sense Hume's investigation is scientific rather than philosophical, and his intention is to.solve longstanding metaphysical problems by using the observational methods of Bacon and the mechanical conceptions of Newton. In his view these had proved so productive in natural science that there was every reason to think they would prove profitable in the mental and moral sciences also. He makes this very plain in the Introduction to the Treatise, but it is made plainer still in its 'revised' version, namely the Enquiries. In the Section 'Of Miracles' in the first Enquiry he expressly seeks additional authority for his argument by asserting that 'Lord Bacon seems to have embraced the same principles of reasoning'4, and in the Section on Justice in the second Enquiry he claims that his argument is an application of 'Newton's chief rule of philosophizing'5. claim to originality lay in the adoption of a method wholly new to philosophy, and that (in his case) this new method was the method employed by the natural scientists. In his adoption of the 'scientific' method, however, Hume was not as novel as he supposed. In fact, the move to a 'science of mind' as the basis of moral philosophy is now recognized to be a distinguishing feature of the period quite generally, and of writers belonging to the Scottish Enlightenment especially. Indeed the movement was so widespread that Pope could include the dictum 'account for the moral, as for natr'l things' in his Essay on Man. But the difference between Hume and many of his contemporaries is that, while they saw in the science of mind a new basis for moral philosophy, he develops it in a way that essentially divorces the two. Whereas Alexander Gerard, for instance, thought that 'we must inquire what is the constitution & structure of human Nature' in order 'to discover whether Virtue has any foundation in the nature of man'6, it is well known that on the basis of an empirical account of human nature Hume uncovers a logical gap between is (nature) and ought (virtue). Indeed, this is just one of several traditional philosophical positions that he undermines. Notably, he finds no logically conclusive basis for inductive reasoning, cannot find any ground for attributing necessity to causal relations, and argues that reason is necessarily inert with respect to action, which is always determined by desire or 'the passions'. The gaps that these conclusions seem to present to our customary ways of thinking are, in the end, to be bridged by recording that this is just how the human mind typically works. It is our brute nature, not logical intelligibility, that underlies the simple passage from one thought or belief to another. So, since we cannot prove that the future will be like the past, or that a cause must give rise to its effect, we must rest content with the observation that 'reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls which carries us along a certain train of ideas... [This] habit is nothing but one of the principles of nature, and derives all its force from that origin' (my emphasis)7.
Whether Hume is right about this is obviously of crucial importance to his enterprise, but it is not the topic of this essay. Here it is sufficient to note that these sceptical conclusions prompted many philosophers to mount a counter attack. Modern philosophers as well as the Peripatetics and Epicureans of old, have conceived that external objects cannot be the immediate objects of our thought; that there must be some image of them in the mind itself, in which, as in a mirror, they are seen. And the same idea, in the philosophical sense of it, is given to those internal and immediate objects of our thoughts. The external thing is the remote or mediate object; but the idea, or image of that object in the mind, is the immediate object, without which we could have no perception, no remembrance, no conception of the mediate object."' It follows from this 'theory of ideas' that if we are to move from the interior contents of the mind to the exterior world of present and past, and thus suppose that the mind accurately captures or reflects reality, we require some sort of reasoning or inference. Reid contends that the theory of ideas, being a philosophical theory, if it is seriously to call into question the beliefs of common sense, requires a better ground upon which to base itself than the common sense which it displaces. This is (he thinks) what it cannot have. There is no better ground than common sense. That is to say, at the root of our everyday beliefs are certain principles of judgment and inference which we naturally (in the sense of unreflectively) employ, and which, importantly, we cannot fail to employ without falling into confusion and sceptical error. And in Essay Six 'Of Judgement' he gives several examples of these. But there is a puzzle here. Hume, as we noted, claims to found his account of morality on a simple observation of how, as a matter of fact, the human mind works. Among many of his contemporaries one of Reid's greatest achievements is also his championship of the science of mind. Paul Wood quotes Robert Eden Scott as saying 'it is to a name of so recent date as our countryman Reid that we are to consider [the science of mind] as indebted to so firm a foundation'3. But the passage from Reid quoted above raises this question. Is Reid's account of these 'first' principles of the mind any more than a matter of saying: these are the ways in which, as a matter of fact, the human mind typically works? If so, this, it seems, is just what Hume also says. Where, then, is the difference? Hume sets out to describe human nature because, he believes, this is the best foundation for natural philosophy and thus for the moral sciences. If he is right, we must rest content with how human beings do think as a matter of fact. We must resist any impulse to search out a deeper level of intelligibility. In response, and in opposition apparently, Reid argues that Hume's conclusions are unconvincing because they run contrary to the principles of how human beings think, and because there is no better ground upon which to base any reasoning. By routes that are different, no doubt, Hume the sceptical subverter of ordinary opinion, and Reid the rational defender of it, appear to have arrived at the same conclusion. But in this case, despite appearances and Reid's own understanding of the matter, there seems to be little to choose between philosophical scepticism and common sense.
Alexander Broadie has noted this same difficulty. 
III
Striking though this conclusion may be, I think further reflection shows it to be incorrect. Despite the care and clarity with which Reid writes and argues, there is not, as it seems to me, a definitive interpretation of all that he says, and accordingly it is possible that unwittingly he does indeed end up pretty close to Hume. If this is an accurate reading of the situation however, it is so only in so far as we rest content with the true observation that both Hume and Reid base their arguments on an appeal to human nature and both suppose that there is a clear sense in which no further rational basis is either possible or required. It follows from this that there is no fundamental difference between them only if we suppose that they are operating with the same conception of human nature. This, I think, is what is contestable.
We can find our starting point in the concept of judgment, which, as we have seen is the point at which Hume and Reid's account of morality seems to differ, because something of Reid's idea of human nature is revealed by the examples he gives of principles of judgment, the fundamental principles which control the operations of the human mind. Here is the first of them, together with his amplification and defence.
I hold as a first principle, the existence of everything of which I am conscious... When a man is conscious of pain, he is certain of its existence, when he is conscious that he doubts or believes, he is certain of the existence of those operations ...
If any man could be found so frantic as to deny that he thinks, while he is conscious of it, I may wonder, I may laugh or I may pity him, but I cannot reason the matter with him. We have no common principles from which we may reason, and therefore can never join issue in an argument.'5 This sort of argument is now quite familiar. It is not dissimilar to G. E. Moore's appeal to common sense, and it is still regularly reformulated as a way of refuting the sceptic. It can be given a more high flying transcendental, Kantian interpretation than Reid gives it16, but its adequacy against the sceptic is not my principal concern here. I want rather to point out that the derangement of the man Reid imagines-what is lacking in him-is not an operation of the mind, empirically conceived, but a failure to adhere to a normative principle of reason. He still speaks, thinks, puts sentences together, makes claims, certainly, and if such cases were at all common, their examination would have its place in a scientific study of mental processes. However, the point is that if, like Hume, we confined ourselves to experience and observation, we should have to record them as phenomena to be included, and eventually incorporated, in a psychological, perhaps in the end a neurophysiological, theory of the working of the human mind. If this is what we mean by human nature, then such strange and unusual phenomena would be part of it. Within this perspective, Hume is entirely consistent. From the point of view of the empirically observable, these or any other abnormal operations are no more and no less, workings of the human mind. So too with strange or unusual desires. However statistically abnormal, they are no less desires, and so no less entitled To appreciate the contrast I am trying to make explicit compare a different case. Suppose we are explaining the workings of the internal combustion engine. In saying that this part does this and that, that, we are not engaged in generalizing inductively from the operations of a finite set of actual car engines. If we were, then our claims might be refuted by facts about the behaviour of some of them. However, as far as the facts of experience go, some engines work well and others work badly. To make this sort of functional differentiation, we need to understand how an internal combustion engine works, and this means understanding its general design, not recording the actual operations of particular engines. The 'evidence' of an engine that works differently from the standard, is not evidence contrary to claims about its function because it may be malfunctioning. If it is, the facts of its operation can be discounted. Or rather, it is precisely in so far as we have grasped the nature of a properly working engine-the norm-that we are in a position to understand an aberrant one as defective. Understanding the formative principles of design is a precondition of understanding and explaining what is happening in the particular case. The facts of the particular case do not establish, or undermine, the adequacy of those principles. Where standards of manufacture are low, it may be that most actual engines fail to realize their principles of design.
To understand an engine is to think in terms of function, purpose and design relationships. An engine fails when it does not do what it is supposed to. Its nature, properly speaking, lies in its intended operation, not its actual operation. Hume's error from Reid's point of view (if this is a correct interpretation of Reid) is, ironically, that he tries to derive an 'ought' from an 'is'-and fails of course. Reasoning employs normative conceptions at its heart, and the most we can do, at some point or other, is recount these conceptions. Any attempt to provide an account of rational structures in terms of observable events must be inadequate.
Consider, in the light of these remarks, something Reid says about the principle 'those things really did happen which I distinctly remember'.
Suppose that a learned counsel, in defence of a client against the concurring testimony of witnesses of credit, should insist upon a new topic to invalidate the testimony. 'Admitting' says he 'the integrity of the witnesses, and that they distinctly remember what they have given in evidence-it does not follow that the prisoner is guilty. It has never been proved that the most distinct memory may not be fallacious. Show me any necessary connection between the act of mind which we call memory, and the past existence of the event remembered. No man has ever offered a shadow of an argument to prove such a connection; yet this is one link of the chain of proof against the prisoner and if it have no strength the whole proof falls to the ground...' I believe we may take it for granted, that this argument from a learned counsel would have no other effect upon the judge and jury, than to convince them that he was disordered in his judg- ment.18 This could be interpreted as a relatively straightforward appeal to common sense, the sense of the ordinary man, against the idle abstractions of the philosophers, something similar to Dr Johnson's famous 'refutation' of Berkeleyan idealism19. What Reid goes on to 18 Ibid., p. 270. 19 Kant's strictures on common sense fit Johnson much better than they do Reid. They were in fact prompted by Beattie. Whether or not Beattie (described by Hume as 'silly and bigoted') deserves the same opprobrium is a more difficult question. say lends some support to this interpretation. Nevertheless, an important point to note is that what common sense is persuaded of here is not that the counsel's claim is false, but that he is disordered in his judgment-he is not reasoning well. Reid has further things to say about the precise analysis of this disorder. However, these further remarks only underline, by explicating, the idea that the conflict with common sense is not first and foremost a conflict with propositions to which most people unreflectively assent, but a conflict with forms of reasoning that are taken as basic. In other words, it is the reasoning that is absurd, not the propositions it gives rise to. This is a crucial difference in the use that is made of the appeal to common sense. As Reid puts it, with respect to the legal example he gives 'Counsel is allowed to plead every thing for a client that is fit to persuade' (my italics). In short, Hume's reasoning, and in general the reasoning which supports the theory of ideas, is not being conducted as it ought.
If In the case of the engine, its nature in the sense of its proper functioning is that intended by the designer. For Reid, there is no less a designer of human nature than of other artefacts, namely God.
In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion Hume uses the expression 'the Author of Nature'. So does Reid in the Essays. In the mouth of Hume it is no more than an idea. In Reid, there is every reason to think, it is a reality. Here, arguably, we find the fundamental difference between them. Scientific inquiry for Hume is a matter of discovering observable, brute fact. For Reid it is a matter of uncovering providential design. This difference colours their respective philosophies. In particular, I suggest, it results in radically alternative conceptions of human nature, which in turn explains why, despite many appearances of convergence, they are in the end as fundamentally opposed as they supposed themselves to be.
It would be wrong to claim for these observations too great a novelty. Broadie's solution to the puzzle about the dispute between Reid and Hume is somewhat similar. 'Hume faced with the full list of Reid's principle's of common sense would say yes to all of them. The philosophy starts after that. It is plausible to maintain that for Reid, not philosophy but theology starts after that'.2' But if my contention that at the heart of the dispute lie rival conceptions of human nature is sound, this is not correct. Hume could only accept Reid's list by re-interpreting them, by understanding them to be empirical generalizations about the actual operations of the human mind, rather than the regulative principles of its proper operation, which is how the normative language he employs implies that Reid understands them. The question arises as to which is the more adequate conception of course. At this point, however, pace Broadie, Reid's arguments are not theological, but moral philosophical, that is, having to do with standards of intelligibility. I have no doubt that Broadie is right in supposing that Reid took theology seriously in a way that Hume did not. But for all that, the difference between them with respect to human nature, and hence the 'science of mind' of which they both have high expectations, is a difference between philosophical conceptions and not between philosophy and theology.
My conclusion is this. When Scottish moral philosophy is characterized as introducing and deploying an idea of moral sense, this claim, so far as it goes, is true. But once we look a little closer we can see that, despite the similarities of first appearances, the interpreta-tion of this idea which made it part of the wider conception of 'Common Sense' philosophy is not that which figures in the more famous contentions of Hume. Most people, I imagine, think that Hume's belief that morality is a matter of feeling rather than judgment is central to the moral philosophy of the period. But while it may be true that his is the more prominent view (nowadays), that of the Common Sense school construes moral feeling as the outcome of judgment. More importantly, Hume's being in the minority on this point is no accident. It arises from a radical difference behind an otherwise superficial agreement that the proper way to do moral philosophy is as a branch of the science of mind, a methodology that Hume interpreted in a way quite at odds with that of his contemporaries.
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